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Frank: Differences Between Gifts and Exchange: Comment on Carol M. Rose

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GIFTS AND EXCHANGE:
COMMENT ON CAROL ROSE
Robert H. Frank*
As an admirer of Professor Carol Rose's work, I am honored to
have been invited to comment on her Dunwody Lecture. Her essays
are not only provocative but also fun to read, and I am pleased to
report that this essay is no exception.
Gift giving has always posed a challenge to self-interest models of
human behavior. Professor Rose's observations do much to advance
our understanding of this interesting and peculiar practice. Her review
of the law of donative transfers, for example, will persuade most
readers that "good" gifts often have much in common with reciprocal
exchange and that "bad" ones often are much like involuntary takings,
or larceny. I think Professor Rose also is clearly right to suggest that
ordinary reciprocal exchange relationships, especially in the earliest
stages, often require a trust that is a form of gift. In all, Professor
Rose has made a convincing case that gifts and exchanges are sometimes more alike than people might think.
At the same time, however, I could not help but wonder whether
Professor Rose may have found her own arguments too persuasive.
In my brief comment I will argue that Professor Rose goes too far
when she says there is "no such thing as a transfer that is at once
unilateral and voluntary. 'Gifts,' then, appear to be merely purported
gifts: they really are exchanges or larcenies in disguise." 1I will also
argue that although some exchanges may require gifts in the early
stages, this is by no means always the case.
The donative transfer is the centerpiece of Professor Rose's argument. Professor Rose correctly observes that those who "give" their
time to care for a dying friend sometimes do so with the expectation

*Robert H. Frank is Goldwin Smith Professor of Economics, Ethics, and Public Policy in
the economics department at Cornell University, where he is also professor of economics in the
Johnson Graduate School of Management. Educated at Georgia Tech and University of California,
at Berkeley, he was a Peace Corps Volunteer in Nepal for two years. His books include CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON, and MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR.
1. Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading. Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become
Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 301 (1992).
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of being compensated in the friend's will.y Care given with such an
expectation is clearly more like exchange than a pure gift. Alternatively, consider people who, at considerable expense to themselves,
care for dying friends that have no assets to bequeath. Here, no
realistic expectation of future monetary rewards can exist. Care for
an impoverished friend suffering from a nonterminal illness might also
involve some element of exchange if the caregiver generates stocks
of loyalty and affection on which to draw in the future. Care provided
for a dying friend, however, involves no such prospect. Isn't there at
least something of a pure gift inherent in care provided under these
circumstances?
Alternatively, consider someone who wills part of her estate to a
non-profit group like the Audubon Society. The elements of reciprocal
exchange seem altogether absent from such cases. Of course, the public
recognition that often attends charitable gifts might be an ancillary
motive for some donors, possibly implicating some element of exchange. However, many people make such gifts anonymously, and the
recognition that comes from a posthumous gift cannot be of much
value to the donor in any event.
Professor Rose observes that donative transfers can never be considered fully voluntary because of the coercive influence of the donor's
looming death. 3 Yet many people consume at a level far below what
their resources could sustain. Even though they know that they could
leave smaller bequests by consuming more, they still fail to exercise
this option. 4 It is true, as Professor Rose observes, that you can't
take it with you.5 The relevance of this observation, however, is
diluted by the fact that so many people leave so much more behind
than is necessary.
Outside the limited domain of donative transfers, denying the existence of pure gifts appears even more tenuous. Most anonymous donations to charity, for example, are gifts pure and simple. So are acts
of kindness performed for the benefit of strangers, such as pausing
to offer directions to a tourist. While the sacrifices involved in such

2. Id. at 304-05.
3. Id. at 303.
4. One might argue that uncertainty about the exact time of death makes it risky to consume
too much. Many people, however, consume less than the interest on their current assets. Thus,
even those who expected to live forever could increase their consumption with no risk of running
short of resources.
5. Rose, supra note 1, at 303.
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unilateral transfers are often small, they are not always small, as in
the case of the soldier who dives atop a live hand grenade to save his
comrades. These behaviors have precious little to do with exchange.
Assuming that all action is motivated ultimately by self-interest
has become increasingly fashionable in the behavioral sciences. As the
foregoing examples illustrate, however, this assumption is not well
founded. More important, this assumption may be highly corrosive to
our fragile social fabric. The difficulty is that if people are taught that
self-interest is the only important human motive, they may become
more likely to behave opportunistically in social dilemmas.
Investigating this possibility, two colleagues and I recently performed a study to discover whether economists, who are by far the
most enthusiastic proponents of the self-interest model among social
scientists, are more likely than others to behave opportunistically.6
We found numerous indications that they are. For example, academic
economists were more than twice as likely as the members of any
other surveyed discipline to report that they give no money at all to
any private charity.7 We also found that economics majors were almost
twice as likely as nonmajors to defect when playing one-shot prisoner's
dilemmas with strangers.8
This difference was not merely a reflection of the fact that people
who chose to major in economics were predisposed opportunists. We
found, for example, that the difference in defection rates grew larger
the longer a student had studied economics. 9 Questionnaire responses
also indicated that freshmen in their first microeconomics course were
more likely at the end of the term to expect opportunistic behavior
from others than they were at the beginning.1°

6. See R.H. Frank et al., Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?,J. ECON. PERSP.
(forthcoming Spring 1993).
7. Id. (manuscript at 7, on file with author).
8. Id. (manuscript at 13-14). One-shot prisoner's dilemma is a game of strategic choice in
which each player faces a single decision and must either cooperate or defect. Each player must
choose without knowing what the other will do. Each player's payoffs depend on both players'
choices. If only one player chooses to cooperate and the other chooses to defect, the game will
reward the defector with higher payoffs and the cooperating player will suffer the worst payoff.
Both players will receive poor payoffs if both defect; both will receive moderately good payoffs
if both cooperate. Cooperation is best only when both players choose to cooperate. This payoff
structure creates powerful incentives to defect.
9. Id. (manuscript at 20-21).
10. Id. (manuscript at 22-25).
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Professor Rose calls our attention to many interesting ways in
which transfers that appear to be gifts also involve important elements
of exchange." However, by insisting that this is so in every instance,
I fear she encourages an unrealistically pessimistic view of human
nature. Since views about human nature tend to be self-reinforcing,
this may be a costly error.
Professor Rose does an about face in the concluding portion of her
essay and argues that it may be impossible to launch bilateral exchange
in the absence of generosity and trust.12 With this different perspective, she focuses on two problems. The first concerns bargaining over
the division of the surplus from exchange.' 3 Assuming each party is
selfish, each may want to take virtually the entire surplus and leave
just enough for his partner to make participation better than nothing.
However, since both parties obviously cannot take the lion's share,
the transaction may fail, with each side ultimately receiving nothing.
Professor Rose argues that if each side is prepared to "give" the other
side part of the surplus, the deal will go through and make everyone
4
better off.'
I completely agree with this argument. My only question is why
Professor Rose identifies this behavior as a gift. Use of the term "gift"
seems to presume that each partner has an initial entitlement to the
lion's share of the surplus. For unless the share was rightfully his to
begin with, his willingness to assign part of it to his trading partner
cannot be considered a gift. It is more descriptive to say that being
content to settle for a "fair" share of the surplus is conducive to
successful exchange. This distinction is no more than a semantic quibble, for I fully share Professor Rose's view that the "sharp bargainer
[someone who insists on taking the lion's share] is by no means the
image of success in commerce, but instead may well be a fringe person,
a con artist on the twilight edges of the market - someone who can
' 5
find no trading partners except gullible strangers.' 1
Professor Rose then mentions as the second problem the difficulty
that arises in exchanges when both parties do not act simultaneously:
Let us suppose that I have to deliver the tomatoes first, so
that you can have something to eat while you are making

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Rose,
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

supra note 1, at 302-08.
311-17.
310.
310-11.
310.
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the shoes. I must give the tomatoes to you in the expectation
of receiving the shoes later. Why would I do that? . . .if
I am afraid that you will cheat me, I will refuse to commit
myself, and the trade will fall through ....16
Professor Rose acknowledges that the prospect of repeated interactions between the potential exchange partners may make matters
easier: "the fear of mutual retaliation keeps us both in line.' 17 But
then she argues that the threat of future retaliation cannot explain
why cooperation would ever hold on the first step: "How can I be
reassured by future dealings when they have not yet started and when
as yet we have no history of dealings"?' s
This complaint appears shaky on logical grounds, for when two
people face an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, the material
incentives to defect are no larger on the first iteration than on any
subsequent one. In each case, the threat of future retaliation provides
the material incentive to cooperate. The threat of retaliation - or the
lure of the fruits of future cooperation - can be sufficient to initiate
exchange even among purely self-interested trading partners.
Professor Rose could have benefitted from the results of Robert
Axelrod's study of repeated prisoner's dilemmas. 19 With computer
simulations of an evolutionary model, Axelrod investigated the relative
performance of a variety of strategies of play.20 One strategy - "titfor-tat" - called for cooperation on the first move, with play in subsequent rounds that mimicked the partner's response in the previous
round. 21 Axelrod found that tit-for-tat outperformed all other strategies
in many environments, even though many of the other strategies were
designed with the specific goal of exploiting tit-for-tat.2 He thus
showed that circumstances exist in which repeated interaction solves
the problem of starting cooperation.Y Cooperation is started - and

16.
17.

Id. at 311.
Id.

18. Id. at 311-12.
19. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (describing the use of computer simulations to test the effectiveness of a variety of play strategies and
then formulating a theory of social cooperation based on the most successful strategies).
20. Id. at 19-20.
21. Id. at 20.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 27-54.
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sustained - because tit-for-tat players tend to be so successful in
material terms. Knowing this result, it does not seem accurate to say
that someone makes a gift by playing the tit-for-tat strategy. Granted,
the player might run into someone who defects on the first interaction.
The player will not, however, be victimized twice by such a person,
and there are many others with whom his experience will be much
more favorable.
Professor Rose then observes that the community can impose sanctions on those who fail to live up to their agreements.- 4 These sanctions
range from informal measures like social ostracism to the more formal
and sophisticated legal remedies available under modern contract law.
However, Professor Rose argues that these observations simply raise
a more basic question: "How do such . . . communities get started?
How does their history begin, in the absence of a successful prior
history"?2
If cooperation in repeated dilemmas can emerge through the tit-fortat strategy, the origin of larger cooperative structures appears less
of a puzzle than Professor Rose suggests. James Coleman, for example,
describes how norms might originate and be enforced by self-interested
agents in networks of social relations.26 Coleman's account addresses
the difficulty arising when A sees B violate a norm and it is not in
A's material interest to incur the costs of enforcing the norm unilaterally. 27 A will want someone to enforce the norm, but his own narrow
material interests dictate free-riding. Coleman's solution is to note
that if A is part of a social network whose members also have an
interest in enforcement of the norm, it may be possible for others to
compensate A for his enforcement costs.2 C and D, for example, might
each relieve A of some obligation owed to them.
Arguing in similar terms, Robert Nozick describes an invisible
hand mechanism in which the state emerges from a struggle between
competing protective associations. :- Having achieved power, the dominant protective association has an interest to provide a structure of

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Rose, supra note 1, at 312.
Id.
JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY

Id. at 250-51.
Id. at 269-70.
See ROBERT NozICK,

ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss3/2

(1990).

118-20 (1974).
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secure property rights.30 As Professor Rose recognizes, once such a
structure is in place, the conditions for efficient exchange are satisfied:
"Contract law permits the initial element of gift, that first trusting
step, to be made with confidence at the outset of exchange relations,
and contract law thus assures a regime of greater wealth and gains
through exchange." 3' Although it might have been more accurate to
say that contract law obviates the need for gifts, Professor Rose's
point is clear and well taken.
Now why would someone take the first step of organizing a protective association? The puzzle, as Professor Rose sees it, is that
"Leviathan rests on an initial act of giving too, and for much the same
game-theoretic reason that exchange does. Someone has to do the
work of setting up Leviathan. . . ."- Again, the concept of gift comes
to the rescue: "luckily, at least some people make a gift of their
organizational efforts. . . ."" But is the gift construct needed here?
If a dominant protective association did not already exist, would not
great power accrue to whoever formed one? And wouldn't this power
be reason enough for organizers to take the first steps? Neither Coleman's account nor Nozick's account requires motives beyond self-interest.
I believe Professor Rose has missed the mark by insisting that
gifts are always necessary to support exchange. And yet, surely she
is onto something here. Some exchange certainly does seem to rest
on transfers that are very much like gifts.
Consider, for example, the practice of tipping after restaurant
meals. A functional account of this practice might propose that diners
have better information than restaurateurs on how service staff perform and are therefore in a much better position to disburse fair and
efficient compensation. The diners who receive prompt, courteous
service can reward their servers with a generous tip; those who do
not can respond accordingly. In most settings, the theory of repeated
games appears to solve the most salient problem of this scheme the problem of providing an adequate motive for the diner not to

30. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
(suggesting several reasons that a protective association' has an interest in securing certain

outcomes).
31.
32.
33.

Rose, supra note 1, at 314.
Id. at 315.
Id.
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renege. As before, the relevant incentives lie in the future: an unfair
tip now will translate into poor service on the next visit.
However, this reasoning cannot explain why tipping works even
in restaurants where most diners are not regular patrons. From the
perspective of self-interest theory, the astonishing thing is that efficient exchange occurs even in such restaurants: the diner receives
good service and tips commensurately. Although an exchange relationship certainly lies at the core of this transaction, both the good service
and the tip are quintessentially gifts at the moment they are given.
Thus, for example, the waiter who provides good service does not
have a recourse if the diner does not leave a tip. Similarly, the diner
who leaves a good tip cannot realistically be hoping at that moment
to influence the quality of the service he has already received. However, because both service staff and diners are willing to make the
necessary leaps of faith on these occasions, each reaps important benefits.
Likewise, consider the person who must dispose of a bottle of
highly toxic insecticide. The laws of most communities require disposal
of the poison in an approved toxic waste facility. Yet the narrow
material interests of any individual favor breaking these laws. A person alone in her basement faces no risk of being punished for simply
pouring the insecticide down the drain. By doing so, she saves the
trouble and expense of a trip to the disposal center and has only a
negligible share of the negative environmental effects. And yet, if
everyone were to act in this fashion, the negative consequences would
be severe, overwhelming the collective savings. In cases like these,
society has little recourse but to rely on the willingness of individuals
to set aside their own narrow material interests, making gifts of their
time and effort in the name of the common good. Theories of repeated
games, network transfer mechanisms, dominant protective associations, the law of contract, and other devices of the self-interest literature are simply unable to explain cooperative behavior in such circumstances.
Professor Rose has staked out extreme claims in both sections of
her essay: in the first, that no such thing as a pure gift exists;- and

34. In PASSIONS WITHIN REASON, I try to explain how people who cooperate in one-shot
prisoner's dilemmas like these might nonetheless compete successfully for resources in the

material domain.

ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF

THE EMOTIONS (1988).

35.

Rose, supra note 1, at 302-08.
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in the second, that all exchange rests fundamentally on some form of
gift . Not surprisingly, such claims prove difficult to defend - and
not just because one claim seems directly to contradict the other. I
have tried to show by example that many gifts are really the unilateral
transfers they are purported to be. It is also true, however, that
many more gifts than we might have imagined surely do blend into
exchange and others are really indistinguishable from larceny. I have
also argued that many exchange relationships can be accounted for
without recourse to the construct of gift. Yet a surprisingly large
number of exchange relationships do seem to rest on voluntary unilateral transfers.
In conclusion, even though important exceptions exist to both of
Professor Rose's claims, less extreme versions of these claims contain
a strong measure of truth, affording important insights about society
and the law. Professor Rose deserves our gratitude for having called
these issues so vividly to our attention.

36.

Id. at 308-15.
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